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Federal Dynamics of the UK/Strasbourg Relationship 
 
Roger Masterman

 
 
 
Abstract: 
The quasi-federal tension between the centralising and decentralising aspects of the ECHR regime 
underpins current UK debates engaging the legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court’s interventions in 
‘national’ affairs and the domestic means by which the Convention rights are realised.  Perceptions of 
an activist court unilaterally (and therefore illegitimately) expanding the reach of the Convention have 
provoked claims of interference with (legitimate) national autonomy and sovereignty.  This tension has 
arguably been amplified by the application of the Human Rights Act 1998, which has increased the 
prominence of the Convention jurisprudence – and therefore the influence of the Court – within the 
domestic legal order.  A UK Bill of Rights is mooted as the solution to these problems.  Through 
examination of this centralising narrative of the Convention system, and the counter-balancing 
evidence of decentralisation (or subsidiarity) seen at the UK and Strasbourg levels, this piece argues 
that movements towards a UK Bill of Rights – and towards the articulation of exclusive competences 
held by national authorities – undermine the Convention’s animating sense of co-operation.        
 
 
1: INTRODUCTION 
In his 1989 essay ‘“Federal” aspects of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
Colin Warbrick examined the ‘extent to which or the manner in which federal 
concerns make a difference to the interpretation of bills of rights.’1 Specifically, 
Warbrick asked:  
 
How is State autonomy to be maintained against a centralising tendency of the 
federal judiciary … which extends the reach of protected rights into areas 
previously regulated by States? How is the contest between demands of 
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national uniformity and the ability of the States to respond to local needs to be 
resolved?
2
   
 
Taking as his starting point the nationalising tendencies of the United States Supreme 
Court in the sphere of individual rights in the post-New Deal era, Warbrick queried 
the extent to which the European Court of Human Rights could be said to be pursuing 
a similarly centralising approach, ‘Europeanising’ standards of individual rights at the 
expense of variation and policy autonomy across the member states.  Observing the 
expansion by the United States Supreme Court of the protections afforded by the Bill 
of Rights during that period,
3
 Warbrick suggested that a state-level counter-reaction 
had become evident, with the ‘perception now being that the national intervention has 
extended into matters “properly” falling within the power of the States.’4  At the time 
of writing, Warbrick was able to conclude that, while the reach of the European 
Convention into domestic affairs was extensive, the interventions of the Strasbourg 
Court had not (yet) provoked comparable counter-dynamics; the reach of the 
Convention had not ‘threatened the “States as States”.’5  
But given contemporary debates in the UK – and elsewhere – surrounding the 
relative influence of domestic authorities and the European Court of Human Rights 
within the Convention scheme,
6
 Warbrick’s unease was prescient.  As the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court added depth and greater specificity to the 
Convention’s requirements, Warbrick was concerned that the Court would transgress 
the divide, ‘however difficult it may be to define exactly, between international and 
constitutional interpretation’ and in doing so ‘transform the Convention into a 
constitutional bill of rights rather than an international convention.’7  The 
consequences of this, Warbrick wrote, would be significant:  
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The delicate and subtle relationship between the Convention system and the 
national legal system for the assurance of individual rights is a developing 
one. […] There are indications … that a majority on the Court might want to 
abandon the constraints of this international relationship and aspire to a supra-
national or constitutional role. The greater good of protecting individual rights 
would swamp the limitations imposed by considering contrary State interest, 
whether general or particular. The costs of this process, if pursued too 
enthusiastically, are not only likely to be a weakening of the legitimacy of the 
Convention system but, in the short term, an undermining of the national 
systems for protecting individual rights.
8
 
 
For Warbrick, the tension between the centralising and decentralising characteristics 
of the Convention system provided insight into its ‘federal’ qualities, and its ability to 
effectively accommodate national interests and initiatives into an overarching multi-
jurisdictional scheme for the protection of individual rights.  In the context of the 
relationships between the European Court of Human Rights and national authorities 
within the UK, the growing perception of a power imbalance – of an inability of the 
Court and Convention to accommodate such difference – animates deliberations over 
a UK Bill of Rights. The consequences of the perceived trend towards centralisation 
have been to unsettle the balance between state and centralised authority that is 
inherent in the Convention system to the extent that – in the context of current UK 
political discourse at least – it is questionable whether the narrative of the 
Convention’s architecture as ‘subsidiary to the national systems’9 retains widespread 
credibility. These debates have prompted calls for revision of both the internal and 
external dimensions of the UK/Strasbourg relationship. As to the external, it has 
become commonplace for the European Court of Human Rights to be accused of 
over-reach, of utilising the ‘living instrument’ doctrine to develop the Convention’s 
                                                 
8
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protections illegitimately and, as a consequence, of increasingly interfering with 
national sovereignty.
10
  The European Court’s expansion of the reach and influence of 
the Convention is amplified internally through the provisions and application of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 which collectively afford a prominent role to the (European) 
‘Convention rights’11 to the – it is argued – detriment of genuinely municipal 
solutions to the questions posed by rights adjudication.
12
  
A desire to reassert national sovereignty in the face of perceived Strasbourg 
encroachment lies behind Conservative proposals to repeal the Human Rights Act 
1998 and enact as its replacement a UK Bill of Rights. This debate – which it is 
impossible to fully distinguish from Euro-sceptic concerns regarding the influence of 
the European Union – is premised primarily on the sense that the European Court of 
Human Rights is increasingly intervening in matters of policy argued to ‘properly’ sit 
within the remit of national decision-makers.
13
 Through the application of the 
Convention rights to situations unforeseen at the time of their drafting and the 
progressive interpretation of the Convention as a ‘living instrument’, the policy 
autonomy of the States parties has – it is argued – been jeopardised by the perceived 
inability of the European Court to ‘resist the temptation to aggrandise its jurisdiction 
and to impose uniform rules on Member States.’14 The promise of a UK Bill of Rights 
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 Section 1, Human Rights Act 1998.  
12
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responds to this tension through calls for rights adjudication to be repatriated and for 
supremacy over questions of rights to be restored to UK national institutions.
15
  
Discord between the UK Government and the European Court of Human Rights is 
therefore reflective of what Dicey identified as one of the potential costs of 
federalism, namely, ‘the denial of national independence to every state’ within the 
overarching federal structure.
16
   
This piece examines the federal pressures of the ECHR regime as manifested 
in the debate over the adoption of a UK Bill of Rights.  The core centralising 
difficulties of the growing reach of the ECHR and domestic amplification of the 
Convention jurisprudence as a result of the Human Rights Act will be contrasted with 
the upward influence of national decision-making and moves – at the European level 
– to reiterate the subsidiarity integral to the Convention regime.  In the light of the 
continued scope within the Convention system for subsidiarity to be realised in 
practice, it will be argued that the adoption of a UK Bill of Rights – and its promise of 
a clear demarcation of autonomous national decision-making – contains the potential 
to destabilise the co-operative constitutionalism which underpins the Convention 
system.  
 
2: THE ‘FEDERAL’ CHARACTER OF THE ECHR 
While the Convention system cannot be regarded as being fully federalised, it 
nonetheless displays significant federal – or pseudo-federal – characteristics. Roots of 
the federal notion can be found in international law and relations; Locke’s conception 
of the federative power was concerned with governmental powers beyond the state, 
and with the relations between otherwise autonomous state units on the international 
plane.
17
  Though federal structures have subsequently evolved to regulate the internal 
dynamics of national and regional governance, parallels can clearly be drawn between 
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the characteristics of internal federal structures and those inter-state arrangements 
which seek to distribute or share powers between centralised governance structures 
and otherwise autonomous state units.
18
  If the legal relationship between 
state/national units and overarching multi-state/national institution(s) can be accepted 
as providing the bare minimum of a federal structure, it is certainly arguable that that 
in structuring cross-jurisdictional rights protections around an international 
(federal/centralised) court exercising a supervisory jurisdiction over national (states) 
authorities, linkages between the Convention system and explicitly federal systems 
can be drawn and that quasi-federal parallels can be identified.  
 The federal account of the Strasbourg Court and Convention is however 
subject to a number of qualifications.  The fact that the Convention system rests upon 
an international structure that is not, by design, avowedly federal, raises particular 
issues for those seeking to compare it to a federal configuration within a single state.  
It should be acknowledged for instance (as Warbrick did) that, in contradistinction to 
a system of divided powers within a sole state, the ‘functional demand for uniformity 
in a system of international States is less than that within a national federal system.’19  
As much is reflected in the competence of the Court, whose decisions – rather than 
formally acting as cross-jurisdictional precedents – demand a response only from the 
respondent state and may be tempered by any margin of appreciation exercised at the 
domestic level.   
 This limitation is integral to the status of the Convention as an agreement 
between states; a ‘co-operative’20 endeavour that was (and is) politically and legally 
reliant on the continuing acquiescence of its sovereign State membership.  The 
success of the Convention system was therefore contingent on a division of power 
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that would entrust significant and continuing powers to national authorities.
21
  As 
such, the Convention’s division of powers is rudimentary but undoubtedly premised 
on a sense of collective responsibility.
22
  Thus, primary responsibility for the 
realisation of the Convention’s standards rests with the member states and is 
accompanied by the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court (the latter only coming into 
play once domestically-available avenues towards redress have been exhausted
23
).  
Authority for upholding the Convention’s standards was therefore to be a joint 
enterprise shared between national authorities and the Strasbourg institutions, and was 
to be reliant on the positive engagement of both. Such an approach is entirely 
consistent with the view – recently reiterated in Protocol 1524 – that it is the national 
authorities of the member states that provide the foundations on which the Convention 
and the jurisdiction of the Court rests.   
While the emphasis of subsidiarity is generally on the delivery of objectives at 
the local level where that is most appropriate, its implications for central governance 
structures cannot be ignored.  The empowerment of the central authority is a 
necessary consequence of subsidiarity for the reason that the principle implicitly 
justifies ‘central involvement in affairs that cannot be adequately handled at the local 
level.’25  But while subsidiarity implies that the deployment of centralised power will 
occasionally be necessary, further structural characteristics of the Convention place 
limitations on the nature of this central authority.  In spite of the hierarchical 
positioning of the European Court of Human Rights ‘above’ the structures of national 
legal systems, Warbrick wrote that in the Convention context: 
 
… it has to be conceded that the division of power is vastly asymmetrical in 
favour of the States and is not uniform across the range of governmental 
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 N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71 MLR 183, 206-208.  
22
 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2010_ENG.pdf 
23
 Article 35(1) EHCR.  
24
 Article 1 of Protocol 15 ECHR reads: ‘Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance 
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 D. Halberstam, ‘Federal Powers and the Principle of Subsidiarity’ in V. D. Amar and M. Tushnet, 
Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p.35 (emphasis added). 
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powers. There is nothing equivalent to the Supremacy Clause in the European 
Convention. What degree of direct/domestic effect is given to the Convention 
or to the decisions of its institutions is a matter of national constitutional law. 
Although there is the obligation in Article 53 that the States ‘will abide by the 
decision of the Court in any case in which they are parties,’ the Court has 
made it clear that it is for the State to choose the means it adopts to secure 
compliance.
26
 
 
Though sovereignty may formally reside in the legal and constitutional structures of 
the various member states that make up the jurisdiction of the court, the authority of 
the court itself rests on the acquiescence of those states. While in a federal 
constitution a supreme court ‘must be able to strike down state legislation’27 that is 
inconsistent with the constitution, the Strasbourg court’s enforcement mechanisms are 
comparably weak, with the execution of judgments subject only to the supervision of 
the Committee of Ministers.
28
  The Strasbourg court does not therefore enjoy the 
ability to invalidate national legislation which is inconsistent with the requirements of 
the Convention and, as such, ‘does not exercise direct authority within national legal 
orders.’29  Instead judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are in form 
‘essentially declaratory’30 in nature, stating whether a given decision, action or 
omission of the national authorities in question is either compatible with, or in breach 
of, the Convention standards (or falls within the State’s margin of appreciation). 
Further, that the Strasbourg authorities recognise that a certain amount of adaptation 
may be necessary to give effect to judgments at the national level is evident from the 
                                                 
26
 Warbrick, ‘“Federal” Aspects of the European Convention on Human Rights’, at 699-700.  See also: 
S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.56. 
27
 E. Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.55. 
28
 The UK has, for instance, resisted addressing the breach of Article 3 of Protocol No.1 of the 
Convention highlighted in Hirst v United Kingdom (No.2) ((2006) 42 EHRR 41) for over a decade. 
29
 A. Stone Sweet, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutional 
Reordering’ (2011-2012) 33 Cardozo Law Review 1859, 1860 (emphasis added).  
30
 Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330, at [58].  
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allowance that a State is free to implement such decisions ‘in accordance with the 
rules of its national legal system’.31   
In the absence of a clear articulation that decisions of the Strasbourg court are 
both binding and of general applicability, the vision of federalism that emphasises 
separation of governmental competences and the division of sovereignty between 
component units and central authority does not accurately capture the spirit of the 
Convention system.  Wheare’s famous account of the federal principle – ‘the method 
of dividing powers so that the general and the regional governments are each, within a 
sphere, coordinate and independent’32 – emphasises autonomy, arguably at the 
expense of co-operation.
33
  Yet it is the latter which better reflects the animating 
concerns of the Convention system.  In consequence, the notion of the ‘shared 
responsibility’34 of the member states and the European Court for the maintenance of 
the Convention’s protections enjoys a firm grounding in the text of the Convention,35 
the jurisprudence of the Court
36
 and has provided a recurring theme in ongoing 
political deliberations regarding its modernisation, case-management, and 
jurisprudential technique.   The self-perception of the Court in this regard is that of a 
body whose role and function is supplementary – secondary – to that of the member 
states: ‘[the] task of ensuring respect for the rights enshrined in the Convention lies 
first and foremost with the authorities in the contracting states rather than with the 
                                                 
31
 ibid where the example given is of Vermeire v Belgium (1993) 15 EHRR 488.  
32
 K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (1946), p.11 
33
 D. Halberstam, ‘Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law’ in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó, The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012), p.579 
34
 On which see: J. Gerards, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the National Courts: Giving 
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European Convention on Human Rights and the judgments of the ECtHR in national case law: A 
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014).  
35
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rights and freedoms defined in … this Convention’); Article 35 ECHR (the European Court of Human 
Rights will only enjoy jurisdiction in relation to cases in which, inter alia, ‘all domestic remedies have 
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36
 See eg: SAS v France (2015) 60 EHRR 11, at [129].  
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Court. The Court can and should intervene only where the domestic authorities fail in 
that task.’37 
Though the fact that the Convention mechanisms lack the capacity to enforce 
uniformity provides one ground on which recognised federal systems might be 
distinguished, the fact that subsidiarity is built into the fabric of the Convention 
system underlines a structural similarity to formalised federal systems:      
 
Federal systems across the world are generally designed according to the 
principle of subsidiarity, which in one form or another holds that the central 
government should play only a supporting role in governance, acting only if 
the constituent units of government are incapable of acting on their own.
38
  
 
Accordingly, while the primary responsibility for upholding the requirements of the 
Convention lies with the member states, the system demands recourse to centralised 
authority where those requirements have not been satisfied.   
In sum, as Nicol has argued, the European Court of Human Rights has 
traditionally occupied a space on the ‘spectrum of federalism’ between that held by a 
‘classical international tribunal’ and that of a ‘quasi-federal sui generis entity’ such as 
the Court of Justice of the European Union; the interventions of the Court are 
‘perceived as going to the core of national sovereignty’ but lack the ‘hierarchical pre-
eminence’ of those of the Luxembourg Court.39  The gradual expansion of the reach 
of the Convention, and the ‘general acceptance of [the Strasbourg Court’s] authority 
as the ultimate arbiter of human rights disputes in Europe’,40 has however resulted in 
the weakening of the narrative of co-operation and an increased sense of centralisation 
within the Convention system.  Though one of the animating concerns of a federal 
structure is that the central authority should not be competent to arrogate powers to 
                                                 
37
 Jurisconsult of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Follow-up: Principle of Subsidiarity 
(8
th
 July 2010), available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_Follow-up_ENG.pdf  
38
 D. Halberstam, ‘Federal Powers and the Principle of Subsidiarity’ in V. D. Amar and M. Tushnet, 
Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p.34 
39
 D. Nicol, ‘Lessons from Luxembourg: Federalisation and the Court of Human Rights’ (2001) 26 EL 
Rev HR3, HR3.  And see: R. Masterman, ‘A Tale of Competing Supremacies’ UK Const L Blog, 30 
September 2013.  
40
 N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71 MLR 183, 184. 
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itself at the expense of the federation’s component parts,41 in spite of the apparent 
limitations on the Court’s competence, this is precisely the accusation levelled at the 
Strasbourg court.
42
       
 
4: THE ‘CENTRALISING’ INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Assessing the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, Warbrick highlighted the 
following as ‘federal’ techniques of reasoning, indicative of the centralising 
tendencies of the Convention system:  
 
1. The suggestion that there should be no national authority to limit or reduce rights 
as defined by the Strasbourg court (ie in those cases where the right in question 
might be said to enjoy a clearly-defined and irreducible minimum); 
 
2. In determining the content of the right in question, the Strasbourg court finds a 
‘strong majority practice’ across its jurisdiction; 
 
3. A concern that the ‘localization’ of rights will result in unjustifiable differences in 
treatment as between the states.
43
  
 
Warbrick was careful to observe that – aside from the first argument – the European 
Court had developed no theory that made the application of any of the ‘federal’ 
contentions mandatory.
44
  But each of these characteristics remains of relevance, and 
speaks to the (centralised) interpretative function of the Court in articulating the 
meaning of the Convention rights. 
It is a core element of the Court’s role to articulate the minimum standards 
required by the Convention, the level of protection that should be common across 
each of the member states. In performance of this function, the Court may look to 
                                                 
41
 E. Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.64.   
42
 For a robust defence of the Court in the face of these criticisms see: R. Spano, ‘Universality or 
Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in an Age of Subsidiarity’ (2014) 14(3) HRLR 487.  
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 Warbrick, ‘“Federal” Aspects of the European Convention on Human Rights’, at 707.  
44
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whether a ‘European consensus’ can be seen to exist, or can be seen to be emergent.45  
The ‘centralising’ consequences of this exercise, for those states that can be said to be 
a part of the emerging consensus, are rather less pronounced than for those whose 
protections fall below the level set by the majority.  The visible function of the Court 
is therefore to adjudicate the complaints of individuals alleging interference with their 
rights at the hands of the state or its agents, but in doing so it must also seek to 
articulate the minimum level of protection that should be afforded to those rights 
across the Convention system. The individual complaint mechanism is the means by 
which the concurrent purpose of the Convention – the administration of 
‘constitutional justice’ through the articulation of minimum standards of compliance 
in response to serious defects at the national level – is realised.46  There is 
considerable tension between these two core elements of the Court’s function,47 but it 
is in discharging this (constitutional) interpretative function that the Court can be most 
clearly seen to wield a clear centralising influence; indeed as Gerards has suggested:  
 
Only a central institution such as the ECtHR can uniformly establish the 
meaning of fundamental rights and define a minimum level of fundamental 
rights protection that must be guaranteed in all the States of the Council of 
Europe.
48
   
  
In adjudication under the UK’s Human Rights Act, this centralised interpretative role 
has also been recognised.  As acknowledged by Lord Bingham in the influential 
decision of the House of Lords in Ullah, ‘… the Convention is an international 
                                                 
45
 On which see: K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘Does Consensus Matter?  Legitimacy of European Consensus in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights’ [2011] PL 534.  
46
 S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.59. 
47
 On which see: K. Dzehtsiarou and A. Greene, ‘Restructuring the European Court of Human Rights: 
Preserving the right of individual petition and promoting constitutionalism’ [2013] PL 710; F. de 
Londras, ‘Dual functionality and the persistent frailty of the European Court of Human Rights’ [2013] 
EHRLR 38.  
48
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Notion of “Shared Responsibility”’ in J. Gerards and J. Fleuren (eds), Implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and of the judgments of the ECtHR in national case law: A Comparative 
Analysis (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014), p.16 (emphasis added).  
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instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only 
by the Strasbourg court.’49  Considered as a question distinct from whether the Human 
Rights Act permits – as a matter of domestic law – domestic courts to consider ‘the 
Convention rights’ as subtly different to their international law counterparts,50 this 
assessment must be correct.  But the interpretative function of the Court is not 
administered in splendid isolation of the concerns arising within and across the 
member states. The capacity of the Court as a constitutional actor in this regard is 
limited to those cases that come before it.  Though the living instrument doctrine 
permits the incremental development of the Convention jurisprudence, it does so only 
– if operating consistently with the subsidiary role of the Court – where an emerging 
consensus can be said to identify a direction of travel.  The interpretative role of the 
Court is, as a result, doubly parasitic upon trends and developments within the 
member states. 
 And yet, since publication of Warbrick’s essay the Court has, in the eyes of 
many commentators, adopted characteristics of an overtly constitutional court.
51
  That 
the Convention, and the European Court of Human Rights, undertake constitutional 
functions is not open to question; the Court ‘is … a constitutional, or “quasi-
constitutional” court, in the sense of being the final authoritative judicial tribunal for a 
specific constitutional system designed to ensure that the exercise of public power 
throughout Europe is constitution-compliant.’52  The Court is however not the 
creature of a national constitution, but of a concordat between states, and its mandate 
is both provided for and limited by that agreement.  While its decisions lack the 
supremacy or finality typically enjoyed by those of domestic constitutional courts – 
falling to be addressed in accordance with the internal constitutional laws of the 
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relevant member state – they otherwise enjoy significant gravitational pull, providing 
authoritative determinations of the requirements of the Convention.   
The tendency toward viewing the Convention system as being highly 
centralised, to the detriment of national self-government or sovereignty, is clearly 
apparent in discourse surrounding the role of the Convention jurisprudence in 
domestic law and in the projected replacement of the Human Rights Act with a UK 
Bill of Rights. It would be wrong however to assume that this centralisation narrative 
is solely a product of the Convention system itself.  In addition to those centralising 
characteristics of the Convention system highlighted above, current debate in the UK 
emphasises further difficulties at both the international level and in the interpretation 
of the existing mechanism for vindicating the Convention rights in domestic law, the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  Current debate is in particular animated by two core 
concerns: the adoption by the European Court of an expansionist approach to the 
Convention and the increased prominence – or amplification – of the Convention 
jurisprudence in domestic law following the adoption of the Human Rights Act. 
 
An ‘expansionist’ approach to the Convention 
It is now well-established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights that ‘the Convention is a living instrument which … must be interpreted in the 
light of present day conditions.’53  Thus, the Strasbourg Court is not formally bound 
to follow its own judgments
54
 – allowing the Court to ‘have regard to the changing 
conditions in contracting states and respond … to any emerging consensus as to the 
standards to be achieved.’55  The precise content of or, perhaps more accurately, the 
minimum level of protection afforded by a Convention right, may therefore develop 
over time.
56
  While the adoption of the living instrument doctrine pre-dated 
Warbrick’s assessment of the federal aspects of the Convention,57 he voiced a concern 
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regarding the stretching of this interpretative method. Looking to the decision of the 
minority of the European Court in Feldbrugge v Netherlands, Warbrick highlighted 
the suggestion that ‘evolutive interpretation … does not allow entirely new concepts 
of spheres of application to be introduced into the Convention: that is a legislative 
function that belongs to the member States of the Council of Europe.’58  Warbrick 
observed that such an approach:  
 
… seems to me to stay clearly within the international (and even federalist) 
tradition. It recognizes the peculiar characteristics of the treaty under 
consideration without letting them overwhelm the legal basis of the 
Convention, the agreement of sovereign States.
59
   
 
The development of the European Court’s jurisprudence – as the Convention’s 
meaning has been articulated in response to contemporary challenges to rights – has 
resulted in its application to new spheres of governmental activity (and indeed 
inactivity).
60
  The judgment of Judge Costa in Hatton v United Kingdom – concerning 
whether permitted night flights out of Heathrow airport constituted an interference 
with local residents’ rights under Article 8 ECHR – attempts to explain and 
contextualise the need for the Court’s adoption of the living instrument approach:  
 
… as the Court has often underlined: ‘The Convention is a living instrument, 
to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’ … This ‘evolutive’ 
interpretation by the Commission and the Court of various Convention 
requirements has generally been ‘progressive’, in the sense that they have 
gradually extended and raised the level of protection afforded to the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention to develop the ‘European public 
order’. In the field of environmental human rights, which was practically 
unknown in 1950, the Commission and the Court have increasingly taken the 
view that Article 8 [the right to privacy] embraces the right to a healthy 
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environment, and therefore to protection against pollution and nuisances 
caused by harmful chemicals, offensive smells, agents which precipitate 
respiratory ailments, noise and so on.
61
 
 
These statements have been singled out for criticism by one critic of the Human 
Rights Act and of the European Court as betraying the ‘blatantly expansionist’ 
tendencies of the latter.
62
  It should be noted in response that the judgment of Judge 
Costa came in dissent and that the violation found by the European Court in Hatton 
was – as a result of the case arising prior to the implementation of the Human Rights 
Act – that domestic law failed to provide an effective remedy in respect of the 
complaint made. No violation of the applicants’ Article 8 rights was found, and no 
damages were awarded.  
 The expansionist – or centralising – narrative in relation to the extent of the 
Convention’s protections has, however, increasingly gained traction.  The decision of 
the European Court in Hirst (No.2)
63
 has been seized upon by critics as providing 
evidence of the extension of the meaning of the Convention to include rights 
originally ‘excluded’ from the Convention and therefore of the imperialising 
tendencies of the Court.
64
  In the resulting February 2011 House of Commons debate 
on prisoner voting, the former Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor Jack 
Straw argued that, ‘through the decision in the Hirst case and some similar decisions, 
the Strasbourg court is setting itself up as a supreme court for Europe with an ever-
widening remit.’65 
 Senior judicial figures have made similar observations.  Most prominently, the 
views of the Supreme Court Justice Lord Sumption illustrate that concerns relating to 
Strasbourg overreach are evident at the highest levels of the serving judiciary.  Extra-
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judicially, Sumption has described the European Court of Human Rights as having 
become ‘the institutional flag-bearer for judge-made fundamental law extending well 
beyond the text which it is charged with applying.’66 The effect of the application by 
the Court of the living instrument approach has, Sumption continues, been ‘to take 
many contentious issues which would previously have been regarded as questions for 
political debate, administrative discretion or social convention, and transformed them 
into questions of law to be resolved by an international judicial tribunal.’67 The 
consequence of then applying – at the domestic level – that jurisprudence, is to 
preclude the courts ‘from respecting the proper role of Parliament as a representative 
body and of Ministers as officers answerable to Parliament and the electorate.’68   
 So while the living instrument doctrine is argued by many to provide one of 
the essential underpinnings to the Convention’s relative longevity – permitting the 
Court to ‘breathe life into the words of the instrument so as to make it relevant to 
contemporary European society’69 – others perceive the steady encroachment of the 
Court upon areas of law and policy for which constitutional responsibility could 
previously be said to lie within the domestic domain. Though the Court has repeatedly 
stressed that it is not open to it to rewrite the terms of the Convention,
70
 those terms 
have – it is said – been extended to include meaning that its framers cannot possibly 
have envisaged,
71
 or rather less charitably (and in the words of the UK Government’s 
former Minister for Human Rights), have been ignored as the Court has taken it upon 
itself to ‘invent’ new rights.72 
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The Domestic Amplification of the Convention Jurisprudence 
Any assessment of the federal character of the UK/Strasbourg relationship is 
complicated by the fact that one of the core centralising arguments in the case for a 
UK Bill of Rights is the consequence of a legislative exercise in decentralisation taken 
by the UK Parliament.  It has become trite to recall that the purpose of enacting the 
Human Rights Act 1998 was to ‘bring rights home’, but the problem to which the Act 
was the proposed solution was that the Convention rights were seen as being both 
practically and jurisprudentially alien.  The Act therefore sought to deliver on the 
promises to make rights accessible to litigants in domestic courts – saving the delays 
and costs associated with making an application to the Strasbourg court – and to bring 
the Convention rights ‘much more fully into the jurisprudence of the courts 
throughout the United Kingdom’ so that they might be ‘more subtly and powerfully 
woven into our law.’73  The 1998 Act therefore was, and remains, an essentially pro-
subsidiarity measure.  This state-led exercise in decentralisation has, however, given 
rise to a heightened perception of central control held by the Strasbourg court.  
In adjudication under the Human Rights Act, the centralising interpretative 
aspect of the Convention system has been amplified by domestic courts in their 
application of the Convention rights. In discharging their obligations under s.2(1) of 
the Act – the duty to ‘take into account’ decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights in their resolution of disputes arising in connection with the protected rights – 
domestic adjudication has highlighted the potential paradox that the ‘Convention 
rights’ are simultaneously creatures of both statute (the Human Rights Act74) and of 
the Convention itself.  Those readings of the Act which emphasise its domestic 
credentials decentralise interpretative authority over the protected rights, 
understanding them as standards that are subtly distinct from those adjudicated by the 
European Court whose ‘meaning and application is a matter for domestic courts, not 
the court in Strasbourg.’75  The prevailing approach to the interpretation of the Act 
however, has been to regard ‘the Convention [as] an international instrument, the 
correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by the 
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Strasbourg court.’76  Following this understanding of the Convention – and in parallel 
with a reading of the Human Rights Act which sees domestic courts effectively 
operating as local proxies for the Strasbourg court
77
 – the prevalent, 
‘internationalist’78, approach has seen the requirements of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence ‘mirrored’ in the domestic context.79  As a consequence, domestic 
courts applying the Human Rights Act have deferred to (and implicitly acceded to) a 
rather more centralised understanding of the role of the European Court, and have 
treated its decisions – if deemed to be relevant and applicable to the dispute in 
question – as effectively setting precedential standards, regardless of the UK’s 
involvement in the proceedings before the Strasbourg court.
80
  Treatment of any and 
all relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as being presumptively 
to be followed distorts – in its translation into domestic law – the requirements of the 
Convention in two core ways.  First, by regarding decisions taken by the Court against 
states other than the UK as being of greater coercive force than the Convention organs 
themselves would.  Second, by treating what could be seen as a decentralised system 
of constitutional review in a rather more centralised manner.      
In treating the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – generally 
– as setting standards to be applied under the Human Rights Act, the individual justice 
dispensing elements of the Court’s role have been emphasised at the expense of its 
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ability to deliver constitutional justice.
81
  Individual decisions of the European Court 
are treated as being domestically applicable, rather than contributing – collectively – 
to a broader understanding of the Convention’s minimum standards.  Regardless of 
the specific language adopted in the Human Rights Act itself, the result of this is a 
tendency to view the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as 
determinative, and to see the Court itself as an appellate (rather than supervisory) 
body, in turn encouraging the sense that the Strasbourg court overrules decisions 
taken at the national level (rather than declaring such decisions to be in contravention 
of the Convention’s requirements). The symbolism of this appellate (as opposed to 
supervisory) role is as potent in discussions regarding the role and function of the 
European Court of Human Rights as it is to the distinction between review and appeal 
as drawn in the domestic law of judicial review of administrative action and is 
reinforced by the hierarchical symbolism of the Court’s extra-jurisdictional position. 
In the context of the UK at least, the sense that the European Court of Human Rights 
operates effectively as a court of fourth instance will be difficult to displace.
82
  It is a 
view of the Court which is underlined by years of pre-Human Rights Act practice – 
during which time substantive judicial consideration of the Convention could only be 
achieved (following the exhaustion of domestic ‘remedies’) through an application to 
the European Court
83
 – has been implicitly endorsed in judicial practice since 
implementation of the Act,
84
 and has been conveniently assimilated in the anti-
Strasbourg narrative as ‘evidence’ of an over-mighty institution.85  
                                                 
81
 It must be acknowledged that the Court itself, in the determination of decisions such as Von 
Hannover ((2006) 43 EHRR 7) has, perhaps inadvertently, contributed to this perception. 
82
 See: R. Masterman, ‘Deconstructing the Mirror Principle’ in R. Masterman and I. Leigh (eds), The 
United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives (183 
Proceedings of the British Academy) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp.136-137.   
83
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696.  
84
 Including, on occasion, by the Strasbourg Court itself (see for instance: Axel Springer AG v Germany 
(2012) 55 EHRR 6, esp. the dissenting opinion of Judge Lopez Gueva joined by Judges Jungwiert, 
Jaeger, Villiger and Poalelungi).   
85
 See for instance: Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws (October 2014), p.5 (available at: 
https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf), p.3: ‘There is 
mounting concern at Strasbourg’s attempts to overrule decisions of our democratically elected 
Parliament and overturn the UK courts’ careful applications of Convention rights (emphasis added).’ 
21 
 
 
5: ADDRESSING THE STATE/STRASBOURG IMBLANCE: TOWARDS 
SUBSTANTIVE SUBSIDIARITY? 
Given that symbiosis between the member states and European Court is a necessary 
consequence of the Convention structure, it is to be expected that the centralising 
force of the Strasbourg court will be tempered by factors tending towards the 
devolution of responsibility to the component parts of the Convention’s ‘federal’ 
structure.  In favour of a more decentralised application of the Convention’s 
protections, Warbrick highlighted the following considerations:  
 
1. That the sovereignty of States as ‘significant autonomous units’ requires that 
certain matters fall to be resolved at the national level, especially where there is 
uncertainty regarding the reach or extent of the protected right; 
 
2. That any system of divided powers implies a degree of diversity; 
 
3. That there is an intrinsic interest in ‘preserving the leeway for States to 
experiment on social and political questions’; and  
 
4. That – especially in cases dealing with qualified rights – national authorities may 
be the ‘best judges, both more sensitive and more effective, of such issues.’86 
 
Given that the Convention system regards national authorities as the primary level of 
rights protection, it is no surprise that the margin of appreciation – the central 
mechanism employed in the name of promoting the autonomy of the member states – 
encompasses each of the above and continues to figure prominently in the Court’s 
jurisprudence and in attempts to reform the Convention system more broadly.  In the 
light of domestic criticisms of the Court however, it is arguable that the idea of the 
margin of appreciation as a recognition of ‘the latitude which signatory states are 
permitted in their observance of the Convention’ lacks currency.87  Warbrick’s 
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decentralising characteristics emphasise the positive role to be played by the state in 
upholding the Convention.  A narrative which speaks of the imperialising, 
expansionist, tendencies of the Court contains little space for consideration of those 
aspects of the Convention system designed to empower the member states.  
Conscious of current controversy, Judge Mahoney has reiterated that the 
‘object of the Convention system, unlike that of the legal order of the European 
Union, is not to bring about uniformity of national law or rigorously uniform 
implementation of the internationally accepted engagements (that is, the guaranteed 
rights and freedoms) in each one of the participating states.’88  It follows that the 
Court grants not only a margin of appreciation but also does not – as noted above – 
prescribe specific responses, allowing states the scope to determine the most 
appropriate mechanism by which the Convention’s minimum standards might be 
secured within the jurisdiction in question.  The European Court itself has, in a similar 
vein, taken the opportunity to reject the suggestion that it is in the process of 
attempting to homogenise the legal and political systems of the member states: 
 
There [are] a wealth of differences, inter alia, in the historical development, 
cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each 
contracting state to mould into its own democratic vision.
89
 
 
While the very notion of the margin of appreciation suggests that an allocation of 
powers as between the states and the European Court might be possible (for instance 
in questions engaging questions of public morals, national security or where national 
authorities have attempted a proportionate balancing of rights) the division would, in 
practice, appear to be highly porous.  While a wider margin of appreciation may, for 
instance, be permitted to the states in decisions taken in support of upholding ‘the 
rights of others’,90 this does not mean that states have a monopoly on all limitations 
taken on such grounds.  That the dividing line between the Court’s duty to uphold the 
Convention rights, and the state’s duty to uphold individual and group interests as best 
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it sees fit, is therefore reliant on a contextual analysis of proportionality means that no 
clear division of responsibility can be asserted in the abstract with any precision.  
Though this is consistent with the spirit of co-operation between national authorities 
and the Strasbourg court, it is also problematic – especially for those states concerned 
with the cession of sovereignty over questions of national law and policy – for the 
perceived autonomy of the member states.  As a consequence, the repeated emphasis 
by the Court that the Convention system permits domestic variance and considerable 
flexibility in the realisation of the protected rights has done little to mollify critical 
factions in the UK.
91
 
Given the devaluation of the currency of the margin of appreciation, other 
mechanisms of acknowledging decentralisation within the Convention system are 
worthy of consideration. They are noteworthy because, instead of taking the form of a 
concession afforded by the Strasbourg court, they provide evidence of the positive 
influence of national decision making on the reasoning of, and outcomes determined 
by, the Court.   
 
The accommodation of national variance  
Though critics of the European Court dismiss its frequent invocations of the principle 
of subsidiarity as amounting to little more than empty rhetoric, recent UK experience 
provides a number of illustrations of the upward influence of national decision-
making on that of the European Court.  In contrast to those domestic views of the 
Strasbourg court that emphasised its determinative role in the articulation of 
international standards, recent decisions have seen a greater prominence given over to 
the distinctive role played by the Court as an international actor:  
 
It must be remembered that the Strasbourg court is an international court, 
deciding whether a Member State, as a state, has complied with its duty in 
international law to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.
92
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In recognition of this fact (which also speaks to the role of the Court as a body which 
reviews domestic compliance rather than by which domestic decisions might be 
overturned on appeal), it has also – and perhaps belatedly – been recognised by the 
UK Supreme Court that the that the Convention rights ‘have to be fulfilled at national 
level through a substantial body of much more specific domestic law [than that 
emanating from the European Court].’93  As a result, the willingness of domestic 
courts to engage in ‘creative dialogue’94 with the European Court of Human Rights 
has become gradually more pronounced.
95
  Such interactions have been evident both 
in the iterative refinement of the implications of the Convention rights in domestic 
law, and – illustrating the point most clearly – on those occasions on which the 
European Court has effectively adopted the reasoning of the domestic court as to the 
requirements of the Convention in the relevant national context.  As to the first of 
these categories, domestic courts have increasingly sought to identify the flexibility in 
their Human Rights Act-imposed obligation to ‘take into account’ the Convention 
jurisprudence, and have held that in the light of various circumstances, otherwise 
applicable Convention case-law need not be followed.  The UK Supreme Court 
decision in Pinnock provides, in summary, evidence of this more nuanced approach. 
In that decision, Lord Neuberger, with whom the eight other Supreme Court Justices 
agreed, said:  
 
This court is not bound to follow every decision of the European Court. Not 
only would it be impractical to do so: it would sometimes be inappropriate, as 
it would destroy the ability of the court to engage in the constructive dialogue 
with the European court which is of value to the development of Convention 
law… Of course, we should usually follow a clear and constant line of 
decisions by the European court … but we are not actually bound to do so or 
(in theory, at least) to follow a decision of the Grand Chamber … section 2 of 
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the HRA requires our courts to ‘take into account’ European court decisions, 
not necessarily to follow them. Where, however, there is a clear and constant 
line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental 
substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not 
appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we 
consider that it would be wrong for this Court not to follow that line.
96
 
 
Pinnock amounts to a rejection of the precedential approach to the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, instead envisaging a relationship between national authorities and the 
European Court which permits greater space for jurisprudential collaboration. 
That the European Court can also be seen to positively engage with, and take a 
lead from, national authorities further emphasises the co-operation that many argue to 
be lacking from the Convention system.  The decision of the Supreme Court in R v 
Horncastle provides perhaps the most compelling authority to date for both the 
suggestion that domestic courts will not simply apply even relevant and clear 
Strasbourg case-law as a matter of course, and that critical engagement with the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence in domestic adjudication can lead to a reconsideration and 
refinement of European Court’s own stance.97 Following that decision, the willingness 
of the Strasbourg court to reconsider its earlier position on the compatibility of 
hearsay evidence with Article 6(1),
98
 demonstrates the principle of subsidiarity in 
practice and illustrates that national authorities can – and do – play a decisive role in 
shaping the content of the Strasbourg case law.
99
 
The increasing turn of the European Court towards procedural review
100
 also 
provides an example of the preparedness of the Strasbourg Court to accommodate – 
and potentially defer to – domestic legislative decision-making.  Thus, for example, in 
Animal Defenders International – a case concerned with the limitation of political 
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expression, and therefore typically an area in which any margin of appreciation would 
be relatively narrowly drawn
101
 – the Court thoroughly considered the process by 
which the UK’s challenged ban on political advertising had been enacted (and 
subsequently found to be compatible with the requirements of Article 10 in domestic 
adjudication
102
). The Strasbourg court noted that:  
 
The prohibition was … the culmination of an exceptional examination by 
Parliamentary bodies of the cultural, political and legal aspects of the 
prohibition as part of the broader regulatory system governing broadcasted 
public interest expression in the United Kingdom, and all bodies found the 
prohibition to have been a necessary interference with art.10 rights. […] 
 
The proportionality of the prohibition was, nonetheless, debated in some detail 
before the High Court and the House of Lords … both levels endorsed the 
objective of the prohibition as well as the rationale of the legislative choices 
which defined its particular scope and each concluded that it was a necessary 
and proportionate interference with the applicant’s rights under art.10 of the 
Convention.  
 
The Court, for its part, attaches considerable weight to these exacting and 
pertinent reviews, by both parliamentary and judicial bodies, of the complex 
regulatory regime governing political broadcasting in the United Kingdom, 
and to their view that the general measure was necessary to prevent the 
distortion of crucial public interest debates and, thereby, the undermining of 
the democratic process.
103
 
 
The European Court of Human Rights found that national authorities were ‘best 
placed’ to determine what should be regarded as a ‘country specific and complex 
assessment’ of the balance to be struck.104 
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Affording weight to the considered judgment of a national legislature (and/or 
courts) could be said to illustrate in practice that ‘[s]ubsidiarity is at the very heart of 
the Convention’ and is demonstrative that the European Court is ‘intended to be 
subsidiary to the national systems’.105  Instead of affording a concession to national 
authorities, the European Court demonstrates that the decision-making process of the 
domestic legislature will be material, and that decisions adopted following ‘extensive 
debate by the democratically elected representatives’,106 or which can be shown to be 
‘the culmination of … detailed examination of the social, ethical and legal 
implications of developments’107 may be more likely to fall within any margin of 
appreciation afforded by the Court.  
  
Embedding structural subsidiarity 
The UK Government’s chairing of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe provided, in early 2012, a clear opportunity to see concerns relating to the 
perceived diminution of national authority’s influence over those areas of law falling 
within the purview of the European Court raised at a High Level Conference on the 
Future of the European Court of Human Rights. The discussions and outcomes of the 
Brighton conference, held in April 2012, were explicitly animated by concerns 
relating to the perceived dilution of the importance of national authorities within the 
Convention system. Entering into the Brighton conference, the UK Government 
sought to promote revisions to the Convention system in order to emphasise the 
primary role of national authorities in the protection of the Convention rights, to 
reinforce the concept of subsidiarity, to work towards increasingly efficient case-law 
management on the part of the European Court and to ensure consistency in the 
quality of European Court decisions through improvement to the processes by which 
national judges were appointed.
108
 UK Government efforts to confine the jurisdiction 
of the Strasbourg court to cases in which national courts could be demonstrated to 
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have ‘seriously erred’ in their interpretation of the Convention, or to only those which 
raise ‘a serious question’ relating to the interpretation of the Convention rights, were 
ultimately unsuccessful.
109
 Nonetheless, the Brighton process did lead to a notable 
reiteration of the vital place of national decision-making within the Convention 
system.  
The Brighton Declaration saw the shared responsibility of the States parties to 
the Convention and the Courts for ‘realising the effective implementation of the 
Convention, underpinned by the fundamental principle of subsidiarity’ reasserted.  
The text of the declaration sought to undercut suggestions that the European Court 
had usurped the position of national-level protections as the core of the Convention 
system by reaffirming the vital role of national institutions in upholding the 
Convention standards:
110
 
  
The jurisprudence of the Court makes clear that the States Parties enjoy a 
margin of appreciation in how they apply and implement the Convention, 
depending on the circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms 
engaged. This reflects that the Convention system is subsidiary to the 
safeguarding of human rights at national level and that national authorities are 
in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs 
and conditions. The margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with 
supervision under the Convention system. In this respect, the role of the Court 
is to review whether decisions taken by national authorities are compatible 
with the Convention, having due regard to the State’s margin of 
appreciation.
111
  
 
Protocol 15’s suggested revision to the Preamble to the Convention112 could, on one 
reading, be seen as something of a victory for the UK Government’s push towards 
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greater subsidiarity and the acknowledgement of a more generous margin of 
appreciation across the contracting parties. On another, it might be interpreted as little 
more than a formalisation of concepts of interpretation that have been commonplace 
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights since at least the 
Handyside decision in 1976.
113
   
The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights has welcomed the 
amendment to the Preamble to the Convention prompted by the Brighton process 
saying that it ‘signifies a new era in the life of the Convention, an age of subsidiarity, 
in which the emphasis is on States’ primary responsibility to secure the rights and 
freedoms set out in the Convention.’114 While the European Court of Human Rights’ 
continuing commitment to the subsidiarity principle had begun to be perceived as 
being increasingly in tension with the expanding scope of its jurisprudence, recent 
cases have hinted that the European Court’s respect for the democratic decision 
making processes of the member states runs deeper than critics of the Court would 
concede. In the RMT decision, the European Court reiterated that: 
 
In the sphere of social and economic policy … the court will generally respect 
the legislature’s policy choice unless it is ‘manifestly without legal 
foundation.’ Moreover, the Court has recognised the ‘special weight’ to be 
accorded to the domestic policy-maker in matters of general policy on which 
opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ.
115
 
 
Though the UK Government was in fact successful at Brighton in securing support for 
a number of its initiatives concerning the primary importance of domestic 
mechanisms to the European structures of rights protection and the centrality of 
subsidiarity to the reasoning processes of the European Court, there is little evidence 
that the Brighton Declaration has in practice diminished dissatisfaction with the 
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Convention and European Court within the Conservative membership of the Coalition 
Government and the Conservative 2015 General Election manifesto duly committed 
to introduce a UK Bill of Rights which would ‘break the formal link between British 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights.’116 
 
6: CONCLUSION: THE RENATIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS? 
In spite of the evidence of the continuing effort on the part of the Court to 
accommodate, and respond to, the decentralising pull of the Convention’s states 
membership, there remains a powerful sense – within UK constitutional and political 
discourse – that the centralising influence of the European Court of Human Rights 
remains too great.  On the one hand, domestic courts have begun to address the 
perceived imbalance between national and European protections for rights – in part a 
product of their own interpretation of the provisions of the Human Rights Act – 
through examination of those circumstances in which departure from the Convention 
jurisprudence might be possible.  This subtle movement in the courts’ understanding 
of the role of the Act has been accompanied by more direct attempts to accentuate the 
continuing utility of the common law as a means by which rights can be protected.  
Attempts by Supreme Court Justices to re-emphasise that the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act did not ‘supersede the protection of human rights under the common law 
or statute, or create a discrete body of law based upon the judgments of the European 
Court’117 have sought to re-emphasise the capacity of national laws to complement the 
Convention’s protections.118  This common law ‘resurgence’ provides partial evidence 
of a trend towards the decentralisation of rights protections within the Convention 
system,
119
 but it is also arguably a self-correction on the part of the domestic judiciary 
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of what came to be seen as an overly-limiting interpretation of the provisions of the 
Human Rights Act itself.  
 More pertinent – and as much a response to the European Court itself as to the 
deficiencies of the Human Rights Act – is the debate surrounding the potential 
adoption of a UK Bill of Rights.  This debate is an exercise stimulated by a strongly-
held perception that the European Court of Human Rights has adopted an overly-
centralised approach to the application and interpretation of the Convention, and has 
upset the delicate balance between the collaborative responsibilities of court and 
member state in the Convention project.  The adoption of a UK Bill of Rights would – 
its supporters hope – be a firm assertion of decentralisation and an attempt to 
recapture national powers ceded to (or accumulated by) the European Court of Human 
Rights.  It is a project premised on the need to reclaim ‘sovereignty’ and cement a 
relationship in which the (potentially exclusive) competences of states and European 
Court are more carefully demarcated and policed.  As such, it is a defensive step 
towards a dualised model of federal relationship which seeks to underscore the 
autonomy of the member state at the expense of the Convention’s animating sense of 
pan-European co-operation.   
